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The appearance of a novel coronavirus named Middle East (ME) Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has raised global public health concerns regarding the current 
situation and its future evolution. Here we propose an integrative maximum likelihood analysis 
of both cluster data in the ME region and importations in Europe to assess transmission scenario 
and incidence of sporadic infections. Our approach is based on a spatial-transmission model 
integrating mobility data worldwide and allows for variations in the zoonotic/environmental 
transmission and underascertainment. Maximum likelihood estimates for the ME region indicate 
the occurrence of a subcritical epidemic (      , 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.30–0.77) 
associated with a 0.28 (95% CI 0.12–0.85) daily rate of sporadic introductions. Infections in the 
region appear to be mainly dominated by zoonotic/environmental transmissions, with possible 
underascertainment (95% CI of estimated to observed sporadic cases in the range 1.03–7.32). 
No time evolution of the situation emerges. Analyses of flight passenger data from the region 
indicate areas at high risk of importation. While dismissing an immediate threat for global health 
security, this analysis provides a baseline scenario for future reference and updates, suggests 
reinforced surveillance to limit underascertainment, and calls for increased alertness in high-
risk areas worldwide. 
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Introduction 
As of August 31, 2013, a total of 108 laboratory confirmed cases of human infection with the 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) have been reported to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) [1]. Since the emergence of the virus, a rapid coordinated response 
has been put in place to confront the novel epidemic emergency, through the identification and 
sequencing of the virus [2], the enhancement of surveillance systems, the provision of updated 
information on the situation and of technical guidance for the clinical management of probable 
infections [3-7], the identification of the possible virus reservoir [8]. There are still many 
uncertainties about various aspects of the outbreak, including a possible extension of the 
reservoir to other hosts, its full geographic extent, the path of transmission of the infection to 
humans and the associated risk. All these aspects call for heightened surveillance, enhanced 
investigations and the development and application of epidemiological methods to assess the 
current epidemic situation and determine its potential to spread efficiently in human population 
and to widely circulate at a global scale.  
In such situation, statistical, mathematical and computational methods allow estimating key 
epidemiological parameters from available data, under various assumptions and accounting for 
the many uncertainties. The reproductive number, i.e. the average number of secondary cases 
generated by a primary case, is a key summary measure of the transmissibility of an emerging 
infection. A first estimation of the MERS-CoV reproductive number was based on the analysis of 
cluster-size data with assumed cluster partition in terms of transmission trees, highlighting the 
similarity of current MERS-CoV situation to the prepandemic stage of the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak [9]. Next to transmissibility, an additional important 
aspect characterizing the epidemic remains unknown, i.e. the incidence of infection. Observed 
cases may indeed only represent a proportion of the current epidemic, with a majority of 
infections going undetected because of mild illness or asymptomatic infection. This aspect also 
has further relevant implications for the correct estimation of other important overall statistics 
(e.g. the severity of the virus) and of the risk of importation of cases in other regions of the 
world. Limited data may also hide important changes in the virus transmissibility related, e.g., to 
viral adaptations to humans that may alter its pandemic potential, thus presenting an additional 
challenge for the situation assessment.  
Here we present an innovative integrative maximum likelihood approach to describe the current 
epidemic situation in the Middle East (ME) region and fill these gaps in current knowledge. We 
synthesize evidence from multiple sources of information: sizes of clusters of cases, traffic data, 
and imported cases outside the ME region. Methods used account for the limited information 
available and reporting inaccuracies. Our aim is to complete early findings on MERS-CoV 
epidemic by focusing on the virus transmissibility from human-to-human, its possible changes in 
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time, the expected number of cases in the region, and the public health threat for other 
geographical areas based on case importation. 
 
Methods 
Analytic overview. The integrative approach we use is based on a combined maximum 
likelihood analysis to jointly estimate the reproductive number  and the daily rate     of 
sporadic introduction of the virus in the population through zoonotic/environmental 
transmissions [10]. The integrative approach builds on two aspects of the currently reported 
outbreak – the distribution of cluster sizes, providing information on   (Method 1), and the 
number of imported cases in countries out of the source region providing information on   and 
    based on the fit of a stochastic spatial metapopulation model integrating aviation data 
worldwide (Method 2).  
Method 1. We considered laboratory-confirmed cases in the ME region (Jordan, Qatar, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) reported to WHO as of August 31, 2013 [1] (Table 1). We 
estimated the reproductive number using the cluster sizes distribution. Several distributions can 
be used that correspond to different hypotheses regarding the number of secondary cases 
distribution (offspring distribution) [11]. In particular we considered a Poisson offspring 
distribution accounting for no overdispersion around a common mean [12] and a geometric 
offspring distribution assuming a constant rate of transmission during an exponentially 
distributed infectious period [13]. 
As cluster sizes may be biased downwards by incomplete observation, we allowed for 
uncertainty by assuming that each case in a cluster would go unobserved with probability pcl 
during investigation (      representing no missed cases). This corresponds to the following 
distribution for reported cluster sizes: 
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 )   over a bi-dimensional grid of {     } values. 
We performed a sensitivity analysis by considering: (i) the complete Jordan cluster including 8 
more cases (size=10) identified through a retrospective serology study carried out on 124 
individuals [4,14]; (ii) all laboratory-confirmed cases (108) reported worldwide to WHO [1]; (iii) 
laboratory-confirmed cases in the ME region up to May 31, 2013 [1]. The corresponding cluster 
size data are reported in Table 1. 
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Method 2. Due to large concern around the ongoing outbreak and enhanced surveillance 
following the WHO guidelines for patients returning from the affected area, the detection of 
probable cases imported in countries out of the ME region is expected to be more complete than 
in the source region where primary cases may have gone undetected. Another source of 
information to estimate the reproductive number, discounting possible notification/surveillance 
biases in the source region, is therefore provided by the importation of cases in newly affected 
countries [15,16]. We thus modify and extend a method already used for the estimation of the 
seasonal transmission potential of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic based on the calibration of a global 
epidemic and mobility model (GLEAM) [17,18] to the chronology data of the pandemic invasion 
[16], by accounting for the different transmission scenarios in the MERS-CoV source region. The 
method concurrently allows the estimation of the incidence of infection from sporadic cases in 
the region, and therefore provides a measure of possible underascertainment of cases. 
GLEAM is based on a spatially structured metapopulation approach comprising 3,362 
subpopulations in 220 countries in the world coupled through mobility connections. The model 
is informed with high-resolution demographic data for 6 billion individuals and multi-scale 
mobility data including the full air traffic database from the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) and short-range ground mobility obtained from national commuting data 
[18]. The infection dynamics takes place within each subpopulation and assumes a modified 
SEIR compartmentalization (susceptible, exposed, infectious, recovered individuals) [19] to 
account for different transmission scenarios in the ME region [10]: (i) introduction of sporadic 
infections from zoonotic/environmental transmission with a daily rate     and a uniform spatial 
distribution in the source region; (ii) modified human-to-human transmissibility with respect to 
standard homogeneous mixing in all subpopulations of the model to allow for large variations in 
the number of secondary cases produced by a given primary case. Epidemiological parameters 
for the compartmental model were based on the estimates obtained from the analysis of the 
outbreak data including 22 cases at a health-care facility in Al-Ahsa in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia [6], namely average latency period of 5.2 days and generation time of 7.6 days.  
The daily rate     of sporadic cases emergence in the ME region and the reproductive number   
are the free parameters of the model. For each set of values of these two parameters, GLEAM 
allows the generation of stochastic numerical realizations of the MERS-CoV outbreak simulating 
the local epidemic in the source region and the possibility of international dissemination 
through mobility processes entirely based on real data. We thus generate with a Monte Carlo 
procedure the probability distribution   (  ) of the number    of imported MERS-CoV cases in 
country   out of the seed region as of August 31, 2013 (      stochastic realizations for each 
point (     ) of the space of parameters). Being all independent importation events, we can 
define a likelihood function   (      {  
 })  ∏   (  
 ) , where   
  is the empirically observed 
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number of imported cases per country (see schematic example in Figure 1). We further restrict 
our analysis to countries of Western Europe, to focus on a region where respiratory diseases 
surveillance is homogeneous and with a high sensitivity to detect importations. These data 
consisted therefore in:   
    in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy, and   
    for 
all other countries   in the Western European region (Figure 1).  We estimated the log-likelihood 
over a bi-dimensional grid of (     ) values and used bivariate linear interpolation over a 
refined grid. 
Given the unknown geographical extension of the source of the MERS-CoV infection in the ME 
region and its reservoir, we performed a sensitivity analysis by considering: (i) an extended 
definition of source region to neighboring countries, thus additionally including Bahrain, Iraq, 
Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen (extended source 
region), based on travel recommendations [20]; (ii) a restricted source region localized only in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, i.e. the country in the ME region that reported the largest number 
of cases; (iii) a variation in the time of the initial emergence of the virus with transmission to 
humans, assuming that sporadic cases may be introduced up to two months before the known 
initial cases (Jordan cluster, April 2012 [4]), to allow for lack of identification or detection prior 
to the Jordan cluster. 
Integrative approach combining Methods 1 & 2. Methods 1 and 2 were jointly combined in 
the following integrated likelihood function: 
 (         |{  } {  
 })    (     |{  })  (     |{  
 }), owing to the independence of the two 
observed processes (cluster sizes and importations). Maximum likelihood estimates were 
computed over the 3-dimensional grid (         )  and the deviance 
 (     )     (    (     )     (    )) was used to measure distance from the best fit. 
Associated confidence intervals were obtained by profiling the deviance in the 3D space [21]. It 
is important to note that such estimates cannot be derived from the maximum likelihood 
analysis of each Method considered separately, nor conditionally one to the other, and the full 
computation of  (         |{  } {  
 }) needs to be considered. In this respect, our integrative 
approach represents a substantial advance with respect to prior work based on the analysis of 
cluster data only [9]. 
Air traffic data analysis. We additionally analyzed the air traffic data integrated into GLEAM to 
evaluate the traffic capacity of the airports in the ME region and to assess the importation risk of 
the countries belonging to other regions than Western Europe.  
 
Results 
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The integrated analysis led to a  value equal to 0.50 (95% CI 0.30–0.77) and daily rate     of 
MERS-CoV introductions into the human population in the ME region equal to 0.28 (0.12–0.85) 
(Table 2). These best estimates were obtained considering a geometric offspring distribution, 
yielding higher maximum likelihood values in the analysis. The corresponding best estimate for 
uncertainty in the cluster distribution suggests a consistent fraction of cases missed in cluster 
investigations (   =0.35, 95% CI 0–0.85), but little impact of inaccuracies in reported cluster size 
on the estimates of the other parameters. 
The estimated daily rate    of sporadic cases in the ME region can be compared to the observed 
value (   
       ), computed based on 60 sporadic cases reported between April 2012 and 
August 31, 2013 in the region, including 43 sporadic cases and 13 cluster index cases in the ME 
region (assuming that each cluster is originated by a single index case), as well as 4 laboratory-
confirmed imported cases out of the region [1,3,5]. This yields that the true number of cases 
from zoonotic/environmental transmission might be between 1.03– and 7.32–fold the observed 
number.  
Our estimates are very robust against the addition of cases out of the ME region to the 
distribution of clusters sizes (  0.50, 0.31–0.77; no change for    ). An increase in  , though 
with limited change in the associated confidence interval, is obtained if we include the full 
Jordan cluster of April 2012 by considering also cases retrospectively confirmed by serology 
(  0.65, 0.34–0.80); no variations are obtained in the confidence interval of the estimated daily 
rate of sporadic cases in the region (Table 2). 
Similar results for the reproductive number are obtained when we consider variations in the 
geographic definition of the MERS-CoV source region. Extending it to its neighboring countries 
does not affect the estimated basic reproductive number and associated confidence interval 
(  0.50, 0.31–0.76), but lowers the value of the daily rate of sporadic cases (    0.14, 0.05–
0.38). If we assume that the source region is instead restricted to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a 
substantial increase in     is obtained (4.73, 2.32–15.37), with increase in the reproductive 
number and unaltered confidence interval (  0.60, 0.30–0.76). 
No variation in     was observed in testing a different hypothesis on the offspring distribution, 
whereas an increase for the best estimate of   was found (0.69 in the Poisson case vs. 0.50 in the 
baseline, with similar CIs, Table 2). 
Larger CIs but no significant variation in the parameters’ estimates were observed by 
considering empirical data up to the end of May (Table 2). 
Analyses of traffic data expose large traffic fluxes towards the continents of Asia, Europe and 
Africa (Figure 3) from the ME region. In addition to 6 neighboring countries of the ME region, 7 
were found in South Asia that belong to the set of the first 20 countries with highest traffic from 
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the ME region, 5 in Europe (among which the 4 countries reporting importation of cases from 
the affected area), and 2 in Africa.  
 
Discussion 
Results of our integrative modeling approach suggest the occurrence of a subcritical MERS-CoV 
epidemic in the ME region, as quantified by a reproductive number smaller than 1. The outbreak 
is not able to generate a self-sustaining epidemic in humans, and sporadic cases from 
zoonotic/environmental transmission are expected to represent a large fraction of the total size 
of the epidemic.  
The estimated confidence interval for the reproductive number is found to be very stable across 
changes in the data interpretation. In all cases, considering data up to August 31, we found that 
it is highly unlikely (<5% probability) to have a MERS-CoV outbreak with   above 0.80 or below 
0.30. The variation of the best estimate from the baseline case (  =0.50) to the various scenarios 
explored as sensitivity analysis (up to  =0.69) is explained by the presence of a large region in 
the parameter space (     ) where the likelihood function shows small variation around its 
maximum value (darker red area in Figure 2). This is likely induced by the limited data available 
not allowing us to narrow down the confidence intervals of the estimates.   
The analysis based on the integration of two independent methods allows us to provide an 
estimate for the daily rate of introductions of MERS-CoV infections in human population in the 
ME region, in addition to the estimate for the reproductive number. The estimated 95% CI in the 
baseline scenario (0.12–0.85) compared to the observed value (0.116) suggests a negligible to 
significant underascertainment rate for zoonotic/environmental transmissions (1.03–7.32 times 
the reported sporadic cases), indicating that notified sporadic cases likely represent a 
substantial proportion of the total, but improved surveillance in the region including serological 
surveys around cases is needed. Since evidence for mild illness, as well as for a wide spectrum of 
clinical disease, was observed [3,6], our findings are compatible with an underascertainment 
rate for zoonotic/environmental transmissions that may be due to a selection bias towards more 
severe cases, where patients having mild illnesses or asymptomatic infections may go 
undetected [22].  
Our estimates for the reproductive number are consistent with the results of Ref. [9] – the only 
study to date reporting results on interhuman transmissibility – thus further confirming the 
robustness of our epidemic assessment. Our work presents however substantial differences in 
the methodology and in its achievable predictions that we discuss in the following. 
One major difference is that our integrative approach also allows the quantification of sporadic 
cases underascertainment through the estimate of the rate of introduction of sporadic cases in 
the ME region, combined with the estimate for the reproductive number. In [9], daily 
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introductions are simply calculated on the basis of the two assumed scenarios for the 
transmission trees, i.e. from the assumed number of index cases among the reported data. Our 
procedure instead makes no assumption on the completeness of reported data, or on the local 
transmission trees, and relies on alternative data sources (case importations) to estimate the 
number of sporadic cases in the region.  
The cluster data analysis of Method 1 relies on the assumption that each cluster is the result of 
human-to-human transmission starting from a single index case. While we allow for uncertainty 
in case detection in the close contact investigation, we do not consider the possibility of co-
exposure of epidemiologically linked cases to the same source of zoonotic/environmental 
infection, differently from [9]. In absence of any knowledge about the virus path of infection to 
humans and with insufficient data from epidemiological investigations to reliably reconstruct 
transmission trees within clusters, we chose a worst-case assumption for the transmissibility of 
the virus. This may lead to overestimating the reproductive number, however not affecting our 
conclusion on the subcritical nature of the current MERS-CoV epidemic. In addition, such 
assumption does not affect our analysis based on case importations (Method 2) that aims to 
estimate the size of the epidemic in the affected region, in that it assumes no knowledge on the 
local transmissions, independently of their type (whether human-to-human or 
zoonotic/environmental).  
We considered the cluster analysis (Method 1) restricted to the ME region as we assumed a 
rather homogeneous implementation of control measures around cases that may be different 
from the one put in place in affected countries experiencing importation of cases, mainly due to 
the additional available knowledge of travel history associated to imported cases. The extension 
of the analysis to all MERS-CoV clusters of laboratory-confirmed cases reported to WHO did not 
alter our estimates.  
The spatial component of our approach represents another difference with previous work. If we 
assume that the source of MERS-CoV infection is restricted to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
where the majority of cases has been observed, our estimates indicate that a much larger 
number of sporadic cases in the area would be needed to sustain the observed importation of 
cases in Western Europe (4.73 daily introductions of sporadic cases vs. 0.28 in the baseline). The 
biggest airports, handling the vast majority of the international air traffic of the region, are 
indeed mainly localized in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Jordan (panel A of Figure 3). 
This strongly reduces the traffic capacity of the ME region, as well as the corresponding 
likelihood of exporting cases out of the region, once the restricted hypothesis on the seeding 
area is considered. An analysis based on cluster data only would remain unchanged and would 
not be able to detect important variations in the epidemic size estimation. This result further 
indicates the relevance of air travel in the epidemic assessment and therefore the need for an 
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integrative approach also based on mobility and space. It also implies that improving the 
knowledge of the geographic extent of the seed region is critical, along with the identification of 
the virus’ path of transmission to humans. 
Changes in time of countries’ public health actions for surveillance and control of the MERS-CoV 
epidemic certainly occurred in response to the increasingly available emerging evidence and the 
higher awareness of the disease, however data is too scarce to provide estimates of the 
reproductive number ( ) as a function of time. Here we assumed a constant   for the period 
under study, with the underlying assumption of a constant and homogeneous implementation of 
intervention measures in the region.  
Other possible factors leading to variations of the current situation may be pathogen- and hosts-
related. Evolution of the MERS-CoV virus to adapt to humans and reach sustainable and efficient 
human-to-human transmission represents a potential future scenario, as it happened for SARS 
[23]. We tested for possible variations of   and     estimates by comparing two different points 
in time (end of May and end of August 2013) and found no significant change, except for a 
reduction of the CIs following a larger dataset available for the estimation. Given the available 
data, this result seems to indicate that no variation in the rate of introductions and in the 
transmissibility of the virus has occurred in the last 3 months that may point to differences in 
the transmission to humans or to viral adaptations to human hosts. On the other hand, if 
compared to the reported number of sporadic cases at the two dates, our     estimates are in 
favor of an increase in sporadic case ascertainment as the estimated underascertainment rate 
has decreased in this time period from 2.2–17.5 considering notified laboratory-confirmed cases 
up to May 31 to 1.03–7.32 up to August 31. Further data to update the integrative approach will 
contribute to provide a continuous assessment of the outbreak in case an evolving situation is 
suspected.  
Other events that are related to human movements and mixing may as well alter the assessed 
scenario. Vast international mass gatherings to be taking place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
the upcoming months are expected to bring large number of pilgrims to the affected area, with 
increased rates of local mixing that may favor the transmission of the virus, followed by a 
potential amplification of its international dissemination due to the return of pilgrims to their 
own countries [24]. It should be noted however that the Hajj 2012 occurred with an ongoing 
MERS-CoV outbreak in the ME region, and that MERS-CoV was absent among French pilgrims 
screened prior to returning to France after their participation to the pilgrimage [25]. Similarly, 
no increase in case notification occurred following the Umra pilgrimage in July 2013. Additional 
studies in travelers next to enhanced local surveillance in the region and guidance to local 
authorities would help to assess and control possible changes in the virus transmission with 
respect to last year’s experience [26].  
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Air travel clearly represents the main mean for global spatial spread of infectious disease 
epidemics in the modern world, as it was previously experienced with SARS and the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic [15,16,27-29]. Besides seasonal variations due to specific events (e.g. mass 
gatherings) or in/out flows of expats for seasonal jobs, a potential emerging pandemic in the ME 
area would constitute a very high risk for considerably rapid and wide international spread. The 
ME area indeed covers a central role in connecting different regions of the world and has 
witnessed a dramatic increase of traffic growth in the last decade (153% of relative increase in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2002-2011, 240% in Jordan, 408% in Qatar, 512% in the United 
Arab Emirates, against a global relative increase of 168%) [30]. Analysis of the air traffic data 
integrated into GLEAM shows that large fluctuations are observed in the repartition of travel 
flows on direct connections out of the ME region, suggesting that other countries than the ones 
already affected are at high risk of MERS-CoV importation through infected passengers, in 
particular in the Southern regions of Asia (Figure 3). Similar results were also reported in Ref. 
[24]. Should the outbreak evolve in a self-sustained epidemic, such risk assessment analyses 
cannot rely on travel data only and would require the full integration of the air travel data with 
an epidemic model, as in GLEAM, to explicitly simulate the evolving epidemic, estimate 
importation likelihood [28] and provide predictions for future stages of the epidemic [16,31]. 
With a subcritical epidemic in the ME region associated with a large potential for international 
dissemination, priority for the epidemic control should be given to the identification of the 
transmission of infection to humans to limit sporadic cases, to the reduction of human-to-human 
transmission through rapid case identification and isolation, and to the enhancement of 
surveillance systems in those countries that are at a higher risk of importation because of travel 
flows to/from the affected area.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Cluster size data.  
 
size of cluster baseline (all lab-
confirmed cases in 
the ME region) 
considering the full 
Jordan April 2012 
cluster (including 
probable cases) 
considering all lab-
confirmed cases 
worldwide 
considering data up 
to May 31, 2013 
sporadic case 42 42 44 16 
2 8 7 10 2 
3 2 2 4 1 
5 2 2 2 _ 
10 - 1 - _ 
22 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Table 2. Best estimate values for the reproductive number  and the daily rate     of sporadic 
cases emergence due to zoonotic/environmental transmissions (and corresponding 95% CI). 
Results for the baseline and for the scenarios of the sensitivity analysis are obtained assuming a 
geometric offspring distribution for the analysis of cluster data and for the best estimate of the 
uncertainty parameter,    . The last line refers to the baseline scenario considering a Poisson 
offspring distribution for the analysis of cluster data. 
 
         
baseline 0.5 (0.30–0.77) 0.28 (0.12–0.85) 
considering the full Jordan April 2012 cluster (including 
probable cases) 
0.65 (0.34–0.80) 0.28 (0.12–0.83) 
considering the extended source region 0.50 (0.31–0.76) 0.14 (0.05–0.38) a 
considering the restricted source region (limited to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 
0.60 (0.30–0.76) 4.73 (2.32–15.37) a 
considering data up to May 31, 2013 0.54 (0.34–0.90) 0.43 (0.12–0.95) 
considering a Poisson offspring distribution 
0.69 (0.34–0.79) 0.28 (0.12–00.71) 
 
a to be comparable with the other estimates, this value has been rescaled to take into account the change of population 
size of the seed region; it thus represents the daily rate of sporadic cases scaled to the ME region. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the integrative maximum likelihood approach. 
Method 1 (bottom circle) is based on the maximum likelihood analysis of cluster size 
distribution obtained from laboratory-confirmed cases in the ME region (countries in red in the 
zoomed area). Method 2 (top panel) is based on the maximum likelihood analysis on data on 
case importations in countries in Western Europe, as schematically indicated on the map. For 
each point in the parameter space (     ) we run 4,000 stochastic GLEAM simulations from the 
same initial conditions and parameterized as described in the main text. With each run 
providing the simulated number of imported cases    for a given country  , we can compare the 
resulting simulated probability distribution of    with the observed value   
  for that country and 
compute a likelihood function for all countries in Western Europe.  
 
 15 
 
Figure 2. Heatmap of deviance values vs. reproductive number  and daily rate    of 
sporadic cases. Deviance was calculated as (     )     (    (     )     (    )) using 
the profiled log likelihood (for each pair (     ), the uncertainty parameter     in cluster size 
distribution maximizing the log-likelihood   was chosen). Vertical and horizontal dashed lines 
show the maximum likelihood values for  and    , respectively. Solid white curves contour the 
deviance-based confidence regions of levels 95%, 99%, and 99.9%. The 95% profiled confidence 
intervals for  and     are highlighted in bold on the axes.  
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Figure 3. Air traffic capacity of the MERS-CoV source region and its international 
destinations. Airports in the MERS-CoV source region (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates) are represented with a circle proportional to the daily traffic they handle (panel A). 
Their international traffic, out of the region, is broken down by continent of destination (panel 
B). Breakdown by country for the first 20 countries with highest traffic from the ME region: 
India (11.7%), Bahrain (8.7%), Pakistan (8.6%), United Kingdom (8.4%), Oman (5.8%), Egypt 
(5.2%), Kuwait (4.3%), Iran (3.6%), Germany (3.5%), Lebanon (2.9%), Bangladesh (2.8%), 
Thailand (2.5%), Sri Lanka (2.3%), Singapore (2.1%), Syria (2.0%), France (2.0%), Kenya 
(1.6%), Italy (1.5%), Malaysia (1.4%), Switzerland (1.4%). Statistics are obtained from the IATA 
air traffic data integrated into the model GLEAM [18].  
 
 
